Understanding Screenshot Collection and Sharing on Messaging Platforms: A Privacy Perspective

“for purposes of both collecting and sharing information (Cramer et al., 2022; Mottelson, 2023 ).” ⤴️
“Screenshot collection and screenshot sharing evoke independent privacy harms, warranting their conceptual separation ( Ingber, 2024) .” ⤴️
“Cramer et al. (2022) define screenshot collection as the capturing of content from a device screen to store as a new image file on the same device.” ⤴️
“Mottelson (2023) highlights many people collect screenshots when they just want to remember something.” ⤴️
“privacy turbulence through enabling record persistence” ⤴️
“threat of screenshot collection without proper accountability” ⤴️
“Screenshot sharing is a separate action following—and often dependent on—screenshot collection,” ⤴️
not always dependent on collection; for example, when individuals share screenshots received from others
“not always dependent on collection; for example, when individuals share screenshots received from others” ⤴️
“not always dependent on collection; for example, when individuals share screenshots received from others” ⤴️
“not always dependent on collection; for example, when individuals share screenshots received from others , no initial collection is required. Cobb and Kohno (2017) provide evidence that nearly half” ⤴️
“not always dependent on collection; for example, when individuals share screenshots received from others , no initial collection is required.” ⤴️
“not always dependent on collection; for example, when individuals share screenshots received from others , no initial collection is required. Cobb and Kohno (2017) provide evidence that nearly half of their respondents periodically” ⤴️
“not always dependent on” ⤴️
“not” ⤴️
“always dependent on” ⤴️
“when individuals share screenshots received from others” ⤴️
“individuals share screenshots received from others” ⤴️
“instances where screenshots were shared with others as a means of public shaming.” ⤴️
“screenshot sharing does not always have harmful intent.” ⤴️
“screenshot sharing does not always have harmful intent. For example, youth commonly send screenshots of messages to their friends when they need advice ( Ali et al., 2022) . The state of screenshot collection and sharing research” ⤴️
“youth commonly send screenshots of messages to their friends when they need advice ( Ali et al., 2022) .” ⤴️
“the power of both interpersonal dynamics and platform affordances in constraining existing norms” ⤴️
“investigates whether platforms can help reduce the collection and dissemination of such screenshots, extending communication privacy management theory by proposing affordance-based privacy rules.” ⤴️
“misperceptions of ownership over others’ information shared within digital messages” ⤴️
“providing explicit directions and obscuring others’ messages during screenshot attempts significantly reduces screenshot collection of private messages” ⤴️
“the screenshot feature serves utilitarian purposes (Ali et al., 2022; Mottelson, 2023)” ⤴️
“by highlighting the platform’s role in how people manage others’ information (i.e., platform privacy rules).” ⤴️
“proposes affordance-based privacy rules as a type of platform privacy rule that has the potential to constrain screenshot collection and sharing of digital messages.” ⤴️
“Petronio (2002) would define as privacy turbulence. Privacy turbulence occurs when control is lost over shared information” ⤴️
“it authorizes the permanent storage and dispersion of private conversations without notice or consent from implicated individuals.” ⤴️
“cues which hold co-owners accountable for screenshot collection (Bayer et al., 2015; Kofoed & Larsen, 2016).” ⤴️
“Signal, which allows users to block people who have physical access to their phone from taking screenshots of their messages (Signal, 2021).” ⤴️
“for purposes of both collecting and sharing information (Cramer et al., 2022; Mottelson, 2023). Screenshot collection and screenshot sharing evoke independent privacy harms, warranting their conceptual separation (Ingber, 2024). Cramer et al. (2022) define screenshot collection as the capturing of content from a device screen to store as a new image file on the same device” ⤴️
“Sexting researchers have suggested anonymizing disseminated screenshots unless there is a strong reason not to (e.g., evidence of harassment)” ⤴️
Should screenshots be taken as a different datatype? It’s once they’re stored the same as any other image that they’re easily abuseable…
“Mottelson (2023) highlights many people collect screenshots when they just want to remember something. Nevertheless, screenshot collection can create privacy turbulence through enabling record persistence in a space unknown to others contributing to the conversation.” ⤴️
“Communication privacy management theory” ⤴️
“screenshot sharing is not always dependent on collection; for example, when individuals share screenshots received from others,” ⤴️
“instances where screenshots were shared with others as a means of public shaming. Similar to screenshot collection, screenshot sharing does not always have harmful intent. For example, youth commonly send screenshots of messages to their friends when they need advice (Ali et al., 2022).” ⤴️
“Petronio (2002) conceptualizes privacy boundaries as metaphorical lines to distinguish between public and private information. CPM asserts people form these boundaries as a result of their recognition of ownership and desire for control over private information. Receivers of shared information are designated as information “co-owners.” Once a collective boundary is formed with a co-owner, a rule-based management system governs the co-responsibility of shared information. The co-owner is responsible for following privacy rules regarding who else can know the information (boundary linkage rules) and how much of it can be shared (boundary permeability rules). A breakdown in this privacy management effort—or disruption to established boundaries, rules, and dynamics of information ownership and control— defines privacy turbulence (Petronio, 2002). CPM frames the breaking of established privacy rules as a natural component of the privacy management life cycle (Petronio, 2002), after which information owners recalibrate their privacy management strategy (Steuber & McLaren, 2015).” ⤴️
“researchers have demonstrated screenshots are often leveraged as socialization tools (Cramer et al., 2019), helping to develop trust and negotiate hierarchies of power (Jaynes, 2020).” ⤴️
“Individuals have also reported using the screenshot feature for bookmarking digital information, containing and disclosing private interactions, or reframing content for social media (Cramer et al., 2022; Mottelson, 2023).” ⤴️
“Engagement in screenshot collection and sharing demonstrates a false sense of ownership over co-owned information. Petronio (2002) refers to this as the “pretend factor,” where co-owners feel they have a right to share information that is not theirs. Although the pretend factor was developed in the context of interpersonal gossip (i.e., quoting a previous conversation), the validity attributed to screenshots of messages gives these records more weight than information recall (Yadav et al., 2023). The pretend factor is amplified when a secondary tool (e.g., the screenshot feature; audio recorder) surreptitiously captures records without permission, thereby creating a new record under the newfound ownership of the co-owner. When people sense a higher level of ownership over co-owned information, they are more likely to share it in the future (McNealy & Mullis, 2019).” ⤴️
“Snapchat has been most notably acknowledged for implementing design” ⤴️
“Petronio (2002) defends that privacy turbulence may occur if rules are misinterpreted by the co-owner, creating “fuzzy” boundaries (Petronio, 2002). She argues when rules are explicit, co-owners are less likely to create privacy turbulence. This may include specifically telling a conversation partner not to spread information beyond the confines of the communication platform. Venetis et al. (2012) found more than half of their participants who had previously experienced privacy turbulence failed to provide an explicit privacy rule. As such, co-owners may be less likely to use the screenshot feature to collect and share a digital message when an explicit privacy rule is conveyed by the information owner.” ⤴️
“It is possible that the absence of anonymity—or personally identifiable accountability for actions—may lessen co-owners’ willingness to collect and share screenshots.” ⤴️
“Individuals are less likely to share the personal data of others when they perceive it would be identifiable to the information owner (Pu & Grossklags, 2017)” ⤴️
“Shore and Prena (2023) observed young adults were less willing to take screenshots on platforms that alerted their conversation partner of their behavior (e.g., Snapchat).” ⤴️
“Through their behind-the-scenes business practices and design (e.g., affordances, stagnant features), platforms create non-negotiable privacy rules that override individual desires for privacy. For instance, by instituting preventative features (Bhandari et al., 2021) and guidelines (Chandrasekharan et al., 2017), platforms can constrain harmful behaviors. Shore and Prena (2023) argue platforms have the power to foster rules that prioritize user privacy, proposing “platform rules” as an extension of CPM.” ⤴️
“Technological affordances have been defined as perceived “possibilities for action” (p. 36) situated between the user and technological interface (Evans et al., 2017) that can guide social behaviors (Fox & McEwan, 2017).” ⤴️
“In their discussion of platform power, Nieborg and Helmond (2019) note that even if users opt out” ⤴️
“previously shared data. This exemplifies an interaction between privacy turbulence and data persistence.” ⤴️
“Messaging platforms allow the screenshot feature to extend the lifetime of already persistent conversations by creating and storing a replicated version of the record. The screenshot feature exacerbates persistence on messaging platforms by capturing an out-of-context snippet of a conversation for storage in one’s camera roll and beyond. Due to the screenshot feature, users may not fully trust the privacy supposed to be afforded by ephemeral messaging (Waddell, 2016).” ⤴️
“Obscurity directly targets persistence by constraining messages received by the co-owner from persisting either (a) within their private camera roll or (b) through further dispersion. Hartzog (2018) promotes obscurity to enhance privacy by allowing less transparent access to specific, sensitive information. Hartzog and Stutzman (2013) define obscurity as “a context in which information is relatively difficult to find or understand” (p. 388). Of note, obscurity of information does not imply anonymity. One may be able to deduce who information belongs to while not knowing the specifics of what such information is.” ⤴️
“no research to date supports obscurity as hindering co-owners from engaging in privacy turbulence.” ⤴️
“data collected via screenshot may be completely obscured by producing a black screen in response to screenshot collection (e.g., Netflix) or temporarily obscured through limiting access to private content using password protection (e.g., Snapchat’s “My Eyes Only”)” ⤴️
“antivaccine content through its misinformation policy, Broniatowski et al. (2023) found this did not decrease overall engagement with the remaining antivaccine content.” ⤴️
“Governing screenshot collection and sharing of private communications is particularly important for protecting marginalized groups, as these individuals already sense a heightened risk of identity disclosure online (Duguay, 2016).” ⤴️
“Participants generally followed the explicit rule set by their conversation partner when it instructed them not to share the information beyond the confines of the conversation. These findings align with Venetis et al. (2012), who found individuals were more likely to experience privacy turbulence when an explicit privacy rule was not clearly asserted.” ⤴️
“competing evidence around the efficacy of Snapchat’s screenshot accountability cue raises questions about the strength of ephemeral communication. Research has shown the appeal of platforms such as Snapchat given its ephemerality, which diminishes self-consciousness and encourages playfulness within social interactions (Xu et al., 2016). The screenshot feature challenges ephemeral communication through making content persistent. In line with Bayer et al. (2015), this study showcases that accountability for violating ephemerality norms is not sufficient. Future research should continue to explore strategies to encourage ephemeral digital channels akin to face-to-face communication which allow individuals to discuss intimate topics at zero cost (Hollan & Stornetta, 1992).” ⤴️
“platforms can communicate an explicit privacy rule through creating a “Confidentiality Mode,” which Ingber (2024) proposes as being able to nudge users against collecting screenshots of private communications ex-ante. Through this design enhancement, users would be reminded by the platform—as opposed to their conversation partner— that certain types of communication are meant to be private. Moreover, it would clarify any “fuzzy” boundaries that spur privacy turbulence (McNealy & Mullis, 2019) and serve as a reminder against the pretend factor. “Confidentiality Mode” would be particularly useful in group messaging, where it is more difficult to ensure privacy rules are understood by the entire group (Mansour & Francke, 2021). Explicit cues indicating antinormative behavior have proven successful when used to combat harassment (Bhandari et al., 2021).” ⤴️
“Context-dependence was quantitatively demonstrated within the screenshot sharing model.” ⤴️
“Another way messaging platforms can set expectations for user behaviors is through community guidelines. Chandrasekharan et al. (2017) found Reddit successfully diminished hate speech from subreddits ridden with hate through instating an anti-harassment policy. Reddit’s ban had direct consequences, deleting existing hateful subreddits and those that tried to spring up afterwards (Chandrasekharan et al., 2017). Of note, updating community guidelines is not always effective. For example, while Facebook removed some” ⤴️
“Rules around more sensitive information (i.e., health data) may be taken” ⤴️
“more seriously than other types of information (Venetis et al., 2012)” ⤴️
“Outside of CPM, findings of this study illustrate the goal-oriented nature of information sharing (Bazarova & Choi, 2014).” ⤴️
“Future research assessing privacy management of others’ information should quantitatively control for the perceived risk and benefits of sharing” ⤴️
“future research should take a focused approach to understand how screenshot collection and sharing differ based on the context of the conversation.” ⤴️
“this experiment showcased the efficacy of obscurity to prevent screenshot collection. Platforms should take this finding, and Hartzog’s (2018) push for obscurity in design, seriously. Geeng et al. (2020) similarly suggest blurring as a privacyenhancing feature to keep intimate messaging secure. However, platforms should consider situations in which people need access to unobscured screenshots of messages and provide relatively frictionless routes to achieve this” ⤴️
“This result provides evidence supporting Hartzog’s (2018) argument for embedding obscurity within design, showcasing privacy turbulence—specifically screenshot collection—can be prevented through obscurity.” ⤴️
“it demonstrates the power of both interpersonal dynamics and platform design in the management of others’ information, supporting Trepte’s (2021) theory.” ⤴️
“This study also recognized screenshot collection and screenshot sharing as distinct examples of privacy turbulence. Petronio’s (2002) original definition of turbulence is limited to unintended sharing of information. Future research should continue to provide evidence for the harms of interpersonal data collection. Finally, results” ⤴️
”). Future research should investigate whether people treat others’ data the way they want their own data to be treated. CPM has yet to consider the privacy expectations of the creators of privacy turbulence when it concerns their own personal information. These may be referred to as inherent privacy rules.” ⤴️
“d. This obfuscated consideration of differences that would be dependent on the personal connection one may have with their conversation partner.” ⤴️
“A conceptual limitation of this study was defining screenshot sharing as the transport of the message from a co-owner to a single third party. In reality, third parties can continue to share screenshots with additional people without a connection to the initial information owner. In fact, this behavior is likely because a third party has no connection to the original conversation and thus lacks knowledge of the information owner’s privacy rules (Petronio, 2002). The domino effect of privacy turbulence, including the weakened impact of privacy rules as information spreads, should be examined in future research.” ⤴️
“screenshot prevention efforts are limited in that people can capture private messages using a second device or by installing third party applications. These workarounds should not be targeted, as there are instances where private messages are needed as evidence of harassment (Citron, 2022). Rather, messaging platforms should remind users that communication is supposed to remain private. Future research should explore the use of workarounds to screenshot prevention efforts and how this may alter a screenshot’s authenticity (Yadav et al., 2023).” ⤴️
”. By mitigating use of the screenshot feature to capture private conversations, platforms can start shifting perceptions of ownership and entitlement over others’ information.” ⤴️